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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become the essential
components for various commercialized machine learning
services, such as Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS).
Recent studies show that machine learning services face se-
vere privacy threats - well-trained DNNs owned by MLaaS
providers can be stolen through public APIs, namely model
stealing attacks. However, most existing works undervalued
the impact of such attacks, where a successful attack has to
acquire confidential training data or auxiliary data regard-
ing the victim DNN. In this paper, we propose ES Attack,
a novel model stealing attack without any data hurdles. By
using heuristically generated synthetic data, ES Attack iter-
atively trains a substitute model and eventually achieves a
functionally equivalent copy of the victim DNN. The experi-
mental results reveal the severity of ES Attack: i) ES Attack
successfully steals the victim model without data hurdles,
and ES Attack even outperforms most existing model steal-
ing attacks using auxiliary data in terms of model accuracy;
ii) most countermeasures are ineffective in defending ES At-
tack; iii) ES Attack facilitates further attacks relying on the
stolen model.
1 Introduction
As one of the typical business models, Machine-Learning-
as-a-Service (MLaaS) provides a platform to facilitate users
to use machine learning models (Hunt et al. 2018). Users
can access well-trained machine learning models via pub-
lic APIs provided by MLaaS providers, without building a
model from scratch. MLaaS allows users to query machine
learning models in the form of pay-per-query and get re-
sponses of the model’s predictions. Recent studies show that
machine learning services face severe privacy threats: model
stealing attacks steal functionally equivalent copies from
MLaaS providers through multiple queries (Trame`r et al.
2016; Orekondy, Schiele, and Fritz 2019; Correia-Silva et al.
2018; Pal et al. 2019; Yu et al. 2020). Model stealing attacks
exploit the tensions between queries and their corresponding
feedback, i.e., the output predictions. Tramer et al. extract
machine learning model’s parameters by solving equations
derived from the model architecture (Trame`r et al. 2016).
However, it requires the exact knowledge of ML architec-
tures and becomes difficult to scale up to steal deep neu-
ral networks (DNNs) (Papernot et al. 2017). Existing model
stealing attacks against DNNs require specific knowledge of
Figure 1: Diagram of ES Attack.
the model’s training data: the exact training data (Wang and
Gong 2018), seed samples from the training data(Juuti et al.
2019), and auxiliary data that shares similar attributes as the
training data or within the same task domain (Orekondy,
Schiele, and Fritz 2019; Correia-Silva et al. 2018; Pal et al.
2019).
Most existing model stealing attacks require the knowl-
edge of training data or auxiliary data regarding the vic-
tim deep neural networks, which undervalued the impact of
model stealing attacks. In practice, these data are not always
accessible. Due to recent regulations on data protection (e.g.,
GDPR and CCPA), many types of personal data are hard to
acquire, such as health data and biometric data. In many do-
mains, companies collect data for their own business and
are reluctant to share their data. Government and other or-
ganizations usually lack resources and financial supports to
create open datasets. Often, the quality of public data is out-
of-date and questionable without updates and maintenance.
The availability of appropriate data protects the victim mod-
els from being stolen by the existing model stealing attacks.
In this paper, we introduce ES Attack, a new class of
model stealing attacks against DNNs without data hurdles.
ES Attack heuristically generates synthetic data to overcome
the limitations of existing approaches. Figure 1 illustrates
the diagram of ES Attack. The adversary queries the victim
model with the synthetic data x and labels the data using
responses y via the MLaaS provider’s APIs. The MLaaS
provider may deploy defenses to prevent model leakage.
A substitute model is iteratively trained using the synthetic
data of x with corresponding labels y and eventually ap-
proximates the functionality of the victim model. There are
two key steps in ES Attack: E-Step to Estimate the param-
eters in a substitute model and S-Step to Synthesize the
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dataset for attacking.
Compared to existing model stealing attacks, ES Attack
does not require i) information about the internals of the
victim’s DNN (e.g., its architecture, hyper-parameters, and
parameters), and ii) priori knowledge of the victim model’s
training data. The adversary only observes responses given
by the victim DNN.
In summary, our contributions are fourfold:
1) We propose a novel model stealing framework ES At-
tack that does not require any knowledge of the victim
model’s training data. Compared to model stealing using
auxiliary datasets, our proposed ES Attack improves the
model accuracy by 44.57%.
2) ES Attack generates better synthetic datasets compared
with the auxiliary datasets in terms of quality and diver-
sity.
3) We demonstrate that the stolen model successfully fa-
cilitates black-box adversarial attacks against the victim
model.
4) Three investigated countermeasures are not effective in
preventing ES Attack.
To our best knowledge, this is the first work to steal deep
neural networks without priori knowledge of training data.
2 Problem Statement
In this paper, we consider an image classification task. We
define a task domain T with a training dataset Dtrain and a
test dataset Dtest. Dtrain and Dtest consist of a set of images
and their corresponding labels {(x, l)}. The victim model
fv is well-trained by an MLaaS provider on private training
dataset Dtrain. Users can access the trained DNN model fv
by querying data sample x. MLaaS then responds with the
predicted probabilities of K classes y = fv(x) provided by
the DNN model.
The goal of model stealing adversaries is to build a model
fs that is functionally equivalent to the victim model fv by
pretending themselves as normal users. We evaluate the per-
formance of model stealing on the test dataset Dtest. Note
thatDtest is unknown to the adversary, which is used for eval-
uation only. By mimicking the behavior of the victim model,
the stolen model can achieve good performance on the un-
known test dataset Dtest. We assume that the adversary does
not know 1) the victim model fv , such as model architec-
ture, model parameters, and hyper-parameters; 2) the vic-
tim’s training data Dtrain or auxiliary data close to Dtrain.
3 ES Attack
In this section, we present the design of ES Attack, and pro-
pose two heuristic approaches for data synthesis.
3.1 Design of ES Attack
Model stealing attacks aim to build a model fs that is func-
tionally equivalent to the victim model fv . Theoretically,
if the adversary can train the substitute model on all the
samples in the input space of fv , the substitute model can
achieve the same performance as the victim model. How-
ever, it is infeasible to query all the samples in the input
space. Therefore, a critical step for model stealing attacks
is to explore the input sub-space that represents the task
domain T . Adversaries will mimic the behavior of victim
models in the input sub-space. (Orekondy, Schiele, and Fritz
2019; Correia-Silva et al. 2018; Pal et al. 2019) leverage
public datasets as an auxiliary dataset to train the substitute
model to approximate the output of victim model. The aux-
iliary data share common attributes with Dtrain, which can
be used to train the substitute model. However, these ap-
proaches are not practical due to many reasons: i) Data with
shared attributes is not always available. Confidential data
such as medical images, financial records are not publicly
available. The scarcity of data is still a critical problem in
many domains. ii) The relationship between the available
auxiliary data on the public domain and the task domain
T is unclear, which brings a challenge to select a proper
auxiliary dataset. The rationale for selecting a specific aux-
iliary dataset is missing in most of the existing approaches.
In the experiments, we show that using a randomly gener-
ated dataset, a special case of an auxiliary dataset, fails to
steal the victim model. iii) The quality of data used for train-
ing the substitute model cannot be improved during model
stealing. The data samples are fixed in the auxiliary dataset.
Therefore, we propose an ES Attack to heuristically ex-
plore the potential input space related to task domain T by
learning from the victim model. We outline ES Attack in Al-
gorithm 1. First, ES Attack initializes a randomly synthetic
dataset D(0)syn , which may share few attributes with Dtrain,
most likely fewer than Daux. Second, ES Attack trains a sub-
stitute model fs based on the samples from the synthetic
dataset and their predictions from the victim model. Then,
ES Attack can generate a better synthetic dataset using the
improved substitute model; in the meanwhile, the better syn-
thetic dataset can help improve the substitute model. In this
way, ES Attack iteratively synthesizes the datasets and trains
the substitute model to improve the quality of the synthetic
dataset and the performance of the substitute model. Eventu-
ally, the synthetic datasets will approximate the private train-
ing dataset, and the substitute model will approximate the
victim model or steal the victim model.
Figure 2 illustrates the progress of data synthesis during
ES Attack. In Figure 2, we compare the synthetic datasets
D(t)syn (in red) with the victim’s training datasetDtrain (in blue)
and the auxiliary dataset Daux (in green). Daux may share
similar input space withDtrain, but in most cases, adversaries
may not know the distance between the distribution of Daux
and the distribution of Dtrain. Hence, Dtrain may not be fully
covered by Daux. However, after initializing the synthetic
datasetD(0)syn , ES Attack will iteratively improve the synthetic
datasets D(t)syn(t = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .), and explore more space in
the training dataset Dtrain.
Two key steps in ES Attack, E-Step and S-Step, are de-
scribed as follows.
E-Step: Estimate parameters in the substitute model on the
synthetic dataset using knowledge distillation. The knowl-
edge distillation approach transfers the knowledge from fv
(a) Initial Steal (t = 0) (b) The 1st Steal (t = 1) (c) The 2st Steal (t = 2) (d) The 3rd Steal (t = 3) (e) The 4th Steal (t = 4)
Figure 2: Progress of Data Synthesis During ES Attack.
Algorithm 1 ES Attack
INPUT: the victim model fv , the number of stealing epochs
N .
1: Initialize a synthetic datasetD(0)syn by randomly sampling
x from a Gaussian distribution.
2: Construct an initial substitute model f (0)s by initializing
the parameters in the model using Kaiming Initializa-
tion (He et al. 2015).
3: for t← 1 to N do
4: E-Step: Estimate the parameters in the substitute
model f (t)s using knowledge distillation on the synthetic
dataset D(t−1)syn .
5: S-Step: Synthesize a new dataset D(t)syn based on the
knowledge of the substitute model f (t)s .
6: end for
OUTPUT: the substitute model f (N)s .
to fs without much performance degradation:
f (t)s ← argmin
fs
LKD(fs, fv;D(t−1)syn ), (1)
where f (t)s denotes the substitute model at iteration t and
D(t−1)syn denotes the synthetic dataset at the previous iteration
t − 1. The objective function LKD is defined as knowledge
distillation loss to make f (t)s approximate the victim model
fv:
LKD(fs, fv;Dsyn) = 1|Dsyn|
∑
x∈Dsyn
LCE(fs(x), fv(x)), (2)
where LCE denotes the cross-entropy loss. We train the sub-
stitute model by minimizing the objective function (Equa-
tion 1) for M epochs using Adam (Kingma and Ba 2014).
S-Step: Synthesize the dataset D(t)syn = {x} consisted of the
synthetic input samples. We will describe two data synthesis
approaches in Section 3.2.
3.2 Two approaches for Data Synthesis (S-Step)
We introduce two approaches to generate the synthetic data:
namely, DNN-SYN and OPT-SYN. Both approaches start
with generating a set of random labels and then generate
data samples based on the labels and the substitute model.
The data synthesis approaches aim to synthesize samples
that can be classified as pre-chosen labels by the substitute
model with high confidence.
DNN-SYN. We design a DNN-based generator to synthe-
size images that can be classified by our substitute model
with high confidence. The design of image generator G fol-
lows the major architecture of Auxiliary Classifier GAN
(ACGAN) (Odena, Olah, and Shlens 2017), a variant of
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), which can gener-
ate images with label conditioning. We refer to the data gen-
eration approach using DNN as DNN-SYN.
We describe the procedure of DNN-SYN as follows:
Step 1: Randomly assign a set of labels l = {l1, l2, . . . , ln},
where li denotes a K-dimensional one-hot vector.
Step 2: Train a DNN generatorGwith parameterwG to gen-
erate data from a random latent vector zi. G is optimized
that the generated data can be classified by fs as assigned
labels L with high confidence:
min
wG
Limg(G, l)
def
=
n∑
i
LCE(fs(G(zi, li)), li). (3)
Step 3: Generate a synthetic dataset using the generator
trained in Step 2: Dsyn = {G(zi, li)}.
In addition, mode collapse is one of the critical problems
for training GANs. To avoid mode collapse in DNN-SYN,
we use a mode seeking approach to increase the diversity
of data samples (Mao et al. 2019). Mode seeking has been
shown simple yet effective in mitigating mode collapse. We
generate two images G(z1i ) and G(z
2
i ) using latent vectors
z1i and z
2
i and maximize the ratio of the distance of images
to the distance of latent vectors. In other words, we minimize
the mode seeking loss Lms:
Lms(G, l)
def
=
d(z1i , z
2
i )
d(G(z1i , L), G(z
2
i , L))
, (4)
where d(·, ·) denotes a distance metric. In this paper, we use
`2 norm distance. We sum up the original objective func-
tion Limg and the regularization term Lms and minimize the
new objective function LDNN = Limg + λLms. λ denotes the
hyper-parameter to adjust the value of regularization. In the
experiment, we set λ as 1.
OPT-SYN. Instead of training a generator to synthesize
the dataset, we propose an optimization-based data synthe-
sis approach, OPT-SYN, which operates on the input space
directly and does not suffer the problem of mode collapse. In
addition, OPT-SYN explores a more diverse label space com-
pared to the one-hot labels used in DNN-SYN. OPT-SYN first
explores the possible prediction vectors {y} in the task do-
main T and then minimizes the cross-entropy loss between
{y} and the substitute model’s prediction on the synthetic
data:
min
x
LCE(f
(t)
s (x),y), (5)
where f (t)s denotes the substitute model at the tth stealing
epoch. In the experiments, we find that OPT-SYN performs
better than DNN-SYN does in general.
The proposed OPT-SYN approach is detailed as follows.
Step 1: To explore the possible prediction vectors, we sam-
ple each random vector y = {y1, y2, . . . , yK} from a K-
dimensional Dirichlet distribution with parameterα. Dirich-
let distribution is commonly used as conjugate prior distri-
bution of categorical distribution. From the Dirichlet distri-
bution, we can sample prior probabilities {y1, y2, . . . , yK},
where yi ∈ (0, 1) and
∑K
i=1 yi = 1. α is referred to as
the concentration parameter, which controls the distribution.
The probability density function of Dirichlet distribution
Dir(K,α) can be calculated by:
f(y1, y2, . . . , yK ,α) =
1
B(α)
K∏
i=1
yαi−1i , (6)
where B(α) denotes the gamma function and∑
y1, y2, . . . , yK = 1. In the experiment, we randomly
sample the parameter α from a Gaussian distribution:
α ∼ N (0, 1) to explore the possible Dirichlet distribution.
Step 2: Given the prediction vector y, we synthesize data
x by iteratively minimizing the objective function 5. The
goal is to generate a data sample x∗ that f (t)s predicts x∗
close to y. An adaptive gradient-based optimization algo-
rithm, Adam (Kingma and Ba 2014), is applied to optimize
the objective function iteratively.
4 Evaluation of ES Attack
In this section, we evaluate our proposed ES Attack on
three different neural networks and four image classification
datasets. We compare our results with two baseline attacks.
Moreover, we investigate the data synthesized during the at-
tacks in terms of data quality and diversity.
4.1 Experiment Setup
Victim Models and Datasets. We train three types of
DNN models on four datasets and use them as the vic-
tim models in our experiments. We train LeNet5 (Le-
Cun et al. 1998) on the MNIST (LeCun et al. 1998)
and KMNIST (Clanuwat et al. 2018) dataset. We train
ResNet18 (He et al. 2016) and ResNet34 (He et al. 2016) on
the SVHN (Netzer et al. 2011) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky
et al. 2009) dataset. LeNet5 is trained for 30 epochs using
an SGD optimizer with a learning rate of 0.1 on the MNIST
and KMNIST dataset. We train ResNet18 and ResNet34 for
200 epochs with an initial learning rate of 0.1 on the SVHN
and CIFAR10 dataset. We reduce the learning rate by 10 af-
ter 80 and 120 epochs. We select the models with the highest
test accuracies as the victim models.
Settings of ES Attack. For DNN-SYN, we input a 100-
dimensional random latent vector and a one-hot label vector
into DNN-based generator G. The substitute model fs and
DNN-based generator G is trained by an Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of 0.001. fs and G are trained alterna-
tively for 2,000 epochs each on the MNIST, KMNIST, and
Table 1: Performance comparison of model stealing attacks.
Dataset Model Victimaccuracy (%) Attacks
Substitute
accuracy (%)
SVHN ResNet18 95.40
Random 50.71
Auxiliary 74.84
DNN-SYN 93.95
OPT-SYN 93.97
SVHN ResNet34 95.94
Random 60.95
Auxiliary 82.00
DNN-SYN 93.34
OPT-SYN 93.19
CIFAR10 ResNet18 91.12
Random 11.72
Auxiliary 48.73
DNN-SYN 33.44
OPT-SYN 84.60
CIFAR10 ResNet34 91.93
Random 14.45
Auxiliary 38.55
DNN-SYN 12.69
OPT-SYN 80.79
MNIST LeNet5 99.10
Random 72.18
Auxiliary 98.96
DNN-SYN 91.02
OPT-SYN 92.03
KMNIST LeNet5 95.67
Random 56.39
Auxiliary 59.43
DNN-SYN 90.37
OPT-SYN 90.37
SVHN dataset (N = 2000,M = 1), and 15,000 epochs
each on the CIFAR10 dataset (N = 15000, M = 1).
For OPT-SYN, we synthesize data for 30 iterations (M =
30) in each stealing epoch using an Adam optimizer with
a learning rate of 0.01. We train the adversary model for
10 epochs on the synthetic dataset (M = 10). We repeat
the stealing for 200 epochs on the MNIST, KMNIST, and
SVHN dataset (N = 200), and 1,500 epochs on the CI-
FAR10 dataset (N = 1500). To speed up the stealing pro-
cess, we augment the synthetic dataset by random horizontal
flip, horizontal shift and adding Gaussian noise.
Baseline Model Stealing Attacks. We compare ES Attack
with two baseline attacks - model stealing using randomly
generated data and auxiliary data. First, if the adversary has
no knowledge of the victim’s training data, randomly gener-
ated data could be the only dataset the adversary can lever-
age. We form a random dataset with the random data sam-
pled from a Gaussian Distribution N (0, 1) and their predic-
tion from the victim model. We train our substitute model
using the random dataset iteratively. Second, we consider
public data as an auxiliary dataset. We use data samples
from other public datasets and query the victim model with
them. We construct an auxiliary dataset and train the substi-
tute model on it. To make a fair comparison, we make sure
that all the model stealing attacks, including two baseline at-
tacks and two ES Attacks (DNN-SYN and OPT-SYN), train
their substitute models for the same epochs.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of ES Attacks using two data
synthesis approaches and compare them with two baseline
attacks. We report the accuracy of model stealing attacks in
(a) ResNet18 on SVHN (b) ResNet34 on SVHN
(c) ResNet18 on CIFAR10 (d) ResNet34 on CIFAR10
(e) LeNet5 on MNIST (f) LeNet5 on KMNIST
Figure 3: Substitute model accuracy during attacks.
Table 1. We compare the results with two baseline attacks
that use randomly generated data (Random) and auxiliary
data (Auxiliary) to steal the victim model.
From the evaluation, we observe that OPT-SYN can suc-
cessfully steal the victim models over all the datasets and
model architectures. Our proposed attacks achieve better
performance compared with two baseline attacks. On av-
erage, OPT-SYN improves the best accuracy by 44.57%
compared to the best results of two baseline attacks.
OPT-SYN performs as well as DNN-SYN on the SVHN,
MNIST, and KMNIST dataset. However, DNN-SYN cannot
achieve a good performance on the CIFAR10 dataset, which
is a more complex dataset and the generator G in DNN-SYN
may still cause the mode collapse problem. Both our pro-
posed attacks perform worse than the attacks using auxiliary
data (KMNIST) on the MNIST dataset, which suggests that
the auxiliary data can be used in the model stealing if the
auxiliary data well-represent the target task and the data are
available to the adversary.
Note that we assume that the adversary has no knowl-
edge of any victim’s data, which means the adversary can-
not evaluate the substitute model on a validation dataset and
select the best substitute model during the attack. If the per-
formance of the stealing attacks fluctuates, then the adver-
sary cannot guarantee the best performance of the substitute
model. The convergence of the substitute model is essential
for the stealing attacks without a validation dataset. Our ex-
periments show that the performance of the substitute model
converges after a few stealing epochs (Figure 3). If the ad-
versary has the knowledge of a validation dataset or the vic-
Table 2: ES Attack using Different DNN Architectures.
Dataset Victimmodel
Substitute
model
Victim
accuracy (%)
Substitute
accuracy (%)
SVHN ResNet18 ResNet34 95.40 94.64ResNet34 ResNet18 95.94 94.03
CIFAR10 ResNet18 ResNet34 91.12 82.54ResNet34 ResNet18 91.93 62.73
tim’s test dataset Dtest, the adversary will achieve the best
accuracy. Otherwise, the adversary will use the substitute
model in the last stealing epoch (t = N ). We observe the
subtle difference between the best accuracy and the last ac-
curacy achieved by the substitute model (0.79% difference
on average for OPT-SYN and 1.53% for DNN-SYN). The sta-
ble convergence suggests that our proposed attacks do not
rely on a validation dataset.
We find that model stealing attacks are economically prac-
tical in real-world settings. To steal the victim model for the
MNIST, KMNIST, and SVHN dataset, it costs $48K accord-
ing to the pricing of Amazon AWS (Amazon 2020). It costs
$360K to steal the victim model for the CIFAR10 dataset.
The expenses are much less than hiring ML experts and
collecting data from scratch and can be further reduced via
crowdsourcing.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis of DNN Architectures
We assume the adversary has no knowledge of the victim
model’s architecture. The adversary may choose a different
architecture of the substitute model from that of the vic-
tim model. Thus, we investigate the stealing performance
with different DNN architectures in our experiments. For the
SVHN and CIFAR10 dataset, we use ResNet18 for the vic-
tim model and ResNet34 for the substitute model and vice
versa.
For the experimental results, we do not observe the perfor-
mance loss of model stealing with different DNN architec-
tures for the SVHN dataset, compared with using the same
architecture. For the CIFAR10 dataset, we observe subtle
performance loss using ResNet34 to steal ResNet18 models.
The only degradation of performance occurs when the ad-
versary uses a small model ResNet18 to steal a large model
ResNet34. We believe the degradation is due to the gap be-
tween the size of the victim model and that of the substitute
model. We find similar performance degradation in many
other tasks using knowledge distillation. The performance
of the student model (substitute model in our paper) will be
degraded if there is a gap between student and teacher (vic-
tim) (Mirzadeh et al. 2019). The adversary can easily avoid
performance degradation by selecting a large model. From
our experiments, if the adversary chooses a DNN model with
the same size or the large size compared with the victim
model, the adversary will be able to steal a substitute model
with high accuracy.
4.4 Quality Analysis of Synthetic Data
In this section, we investigate the quality of synthetic data.
Borrowing measurements for GANs, we analyze the qual-
ity and diversity of synthetic data using Inception Score
(IS) (Salimans et al. 2016) and Fre´chet Inception Distance
Table 3: Synthetic Data Analysis using IS and FID.
Dataset Model
Victim
Dtrain
Auxiliary
Daux
Random
D(0)syn
Synthetic
D(N)syn
IS IS FID IS FID IS FID
MNIST LeNet5 9.86 4.22 274.80 1.22 500.16 4.63 257.55
KMNIST LeNet5 9.96 4.75 1073.92 1.78 1498.75 4.70 962.47
CIFAR10 ResNet18 6.89 2.58 5.34 3.45 5.82 4.32 3.31
CIFAR10 ResNet34 7.64 4.16 18.16 6.75 14.88 6.65 18.29
SVHN ResNet18 6.89 2.24 7.62 3.45 5.82 4.32 3.31
SVHN ResNet34 7.64 4.16 18.16 6.75 14.88 6.65 18.29
(FID) (Heusel et al. 2017). To calculate FID, we used the
features from the layer before the last linear layer and com-
pared our synthesis data with the training data. We find that
the synthetic data achieves better quality and higher diver-
sity compared to the auxiliary data.
We compare the four types of data and report the average
values of IS and FID in Table 3: 1) victim’s training dataset,
2) auxiliary dataset used in the baseline attack, 3) random
data generated in the first initialization epoch (t = 0), 4) the
synthetic data generated in the last stealing epoch (t = N ).
The value of FID is evaluated by comparing the data with
the victim’s training data. From our analysis, we find that
synthetic data usually achieves better quality and high diver-
sity than the auxiliary data (higher IS value and lower FID
value). On average over six settings, synthetic data D(1)syn
achieves 60.58% higher IS values and 27.64% lower FID
values than the auxiliary data Daux, which suggests better
quality and higher diversity of synthetic images. The vic-
tim’s training data always achieve the highest IS value: the
training data is the best representation of the input space
among data we investigate. The Random Data are always
the worst data due to the low IS values and high FID values.
We illustrate the examples of generated images in Ap-
pendix (Figures 5, 6, 7, 8). Humans cannot recognize these
images, yet these synthetic data can be used to train a sub-
stitute model with high accuracy.
4.5 Further Attacks: A Case Study on Black-Box
Adversarial Attacks
DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples, a slight mod-
ification on the original data sample that can easily fool
DNNs (Szegedy et al. 2014; Carlini and Wagner 2017;
Madry et al. 2017; Yuan et al. 2019). Black-box adversarial
attacks assume that the adversary can only access the out-
put of the model victim instead of its internal information,
which is an emerging topic in adversarial attacks. After ES
Attack, the adversary has full knowledge of the stolen sub-
stitute model. Can the adversary leverage the knowledge to
conduct adversarial attacks against the victim model?
We evaluate the black-box adversarial attack against the
victim model using the substitute model. We implement a
white-box `∞-PGD attacks (Madry et al. 2017) and lever-
age the transferability of adversarial examples to conduct
the attack. PGD attack is an iterative gradient-based attack
in a white-box setting and has been proven effective in many
machine learning models and tasks.
We report the success rate of adversarial attacks against
our substitute model and the victim model (transferring at-
Table 4: Success rate of adversarial attacks.
Dataset Model
Attack success rate (%)
white-box
victim model
white-box
substitute model
black-box
victim odel
SVHN ResNet18 99.95 99.94 98.71
SVHN ResNet34 99.93 99.90 98.21
CIFAR10 ResNet18 100.00 100.00 93.60
CIFAR10 ResNet34 100.00 100.00 100.00
MNIST LeNet5 86.07 99.57 92.14
KMNIST LeNet5 66.44 99.72 98.99
Table 5: Evaluation of defenses against model stealing.
Dataset Model Accuracy w/odefense (%)
Accuracy w/
rounding (%)
Accuracy w/
top-k (%)
SVHN ResNet34 93.19 92.58 88.76
CIFAR10 ResNet34 80.79 80.31 69.64
MNIST LeNet5 92.03 96.69 95.43
KMNIST LeNet5 90.37 90.03 91.11
tack) in Table 4. We compare the success rate of three ad-
versarial attacks: 1) white-box attacks against the victim
model, 2) white-box attacks against the substitute model,
and 3) black-box attacks against the victim model via trans-
ferring. For the third attack, we evaluate the adversarial ex-
amples generated against substitute model (white-box at-
tacks) on the victim model. We show the performance of
the white-box `∞-PGD attack against the victim model as
well. From the experimental results, the black-box adversar-
ial attacks using the substitute model can achieve the same
success rate as the white-box, which suggests that the sub-
stitute models can transfer the adversarial examples to the
victim model successfully. Almost all black-box adversar-
ial attacks achieve high accuracy rates (over 90%). We ob-
serve that the success rates of the black-box attacks against
the victim models are less than that of the white-box at-
tacks against the substitute models, but the change is subtle.
Hence, most adversarial examples can be transferred from
the substitute model to the victim model.
5 Countermeasures of Model Stealing
In this section, we discuss the defense strategies of MLaaS
providers and evaluate their effectiveness. Given the good
performance of OPT-SYN on all the datasets, we evaluate
three countermeasures against OPT-SYN. We find that the
countermeasures are ineffective in defending or detecting
proposed OPT-SYN.
5.1 Rounding Prediction
The MLaaS providers fix the decimals of the output predic-
tion and zero-out the rest to provide only the necessary in-
formation. For example, if we round the prediction with 2
decimals, then round(0.2474, r = 2) = 0.25. We deploy
rounding predictions with 2 decimals as a defensive strat-
egy. Our experiments show that none of the model stealing
attacks are affected by rounding to two decimals (Table 5).
On average, the best accuracy of the substitute model even
increases by 0.55% and the last accuracy only decreases by
0.30%.
5.2 Top-K Prediction
MLaaS providers only provide predictions of K classes with
the highest probabilities. Since the adversary is aware of the
Top-K defense used by MLaaS provider, we slightly change
the adversary’s attack by making up the missing probabili-
ties of the rest classes. The adversary remains the probabil-
ities of the Top-K classes and set the rest classes with the
same probabilities. From the experiments, we observe that
Top-1 prediction will not affect much on most datasets (Ta-
ble 5). For the MNIST and KMNIST dataset, we find that the
accuracy of the substitute model even gets improved. Top-1
prediction is only effective in preventing model stealing on
the CIFAR10 dataset. However, we believe Top-1 prediction
is a very strong defense, which will also affect normal users
by providing very limited information. On average, the best
accuracy of the substitute model with Top-1 prediction is
only decreased by 2.86%. We find our attacks are minimally
impacted by reducing the informativeness of black-box pre-
dictions in the response.
5.3 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection identifies the abnormal queries sent from
users and detects the abnormal behavior that deviates from
normal ones. For example, PRADA assumes that the dis-
tance between normal queries follows Gaussian distribution
and detects the abnormal queries (Juuti et al. 2019). We eval-
uate the effectiveness of anomaly detection using PRADA
against OPT-SYN We analyzed 300,000 image samples from
the first five stealing epochs on the MNIST dataset. None of
the synthetic images can be detected by PRADA. We be-
lieve that because the images are generated starting from the
Gaussian distribution, the distances between queried images
are too small to be detected by PRADA. Moreover, we find
it is not practical for MLaaS providers to deploy a PRADA
detector due to its high response time. In our experiments,
it takes about 33 hours to process 300,000 images (2.46 im-
ages per second on average). With more images to be de-
tected, the average response time will be further increased.
Therefore, PRADA is ineffective and infeasible to detect the
proposed ES Attack.
6 Related Work
6.1 Model Stealing Attacks and Defenses
Several studies have been proposed for model stealing at-
tacks. Tramer et al. investigated stealing model parameters
using equation solving (Trame`r et al. 2016). However, this
approach is hard to extend to DNNs, which contains a larger
number of than conventional machine learning models do.
Papernot et al. proposed a similar framework to steal DNNs
by training a substitute model (Papernot et al. 2017). Their
goal is to approximate the victim model’s decision bound-
aries to facilitate the adversarial attacks rather than to max-
imize the substitute model’s accuracy. Thus their substitute
model achieves a much lower classification accuracy com-
pared to our work. In addition, to generate adversarial exam-
ples, their approach requires a small set of inputs that rep-
resents the input domain. In our work, we do not need this
strong assumption. From the experimental results, the stolen
model from ES Attack achieves a higher accuracy compared
to that from (Papernot et al. 2017). Existing model stealing
attacks against DNNs require an auxiliary dataset. Orekondy
et al. proposed stealing attacks that assume access to a large
dataset and use active learning to select the best samples to
query (Orekondy, Schiele, and Fritz 2019). Correia-Silva et
al. leveraged public datasets from the same task domain but
with different distribution to steal DNNs. In our work, we
assume the adversary does not have any auxiliary data re-
lated to the task domain.
Several detection approaches have been proposed for
model stealing attacks. Juuti et al. detected the deviated dis-
tribution of queries from normal behavior (Juuti et al. 2019).
Similarly, Kesarwani et al. proposed a detection tool that
uses information gain to measure the model learning rate
by users with the increasing number of queries (Kesarwani
et al. 2018). The learning rate is measured to the coverage
of the input feature space in the presence of collusion. We
evaluate (Juuti et al. 2019) in our experiments and find that
the detection approach is ineffective for our model stealing
attacks.
6.2 Knowledge Distillation
In our model stealing attacks, we use distillation to transfer
knowledge from the victim model to the substitute model.
Knowledge distillation is widely used in model compres-
sion by transferring the knowledge from one model (teacher
model) to another (student model) (Hinton, Vinyals, and
Dean 2015; Buciluaˇ, Caruana, and Niculescu-Mizil 2006).
Most knowledge distillation approaches require the knowl-
edge of training data. Recently, knowledge distillation with-
out training data has recently been investigated (Lopes,
Fenu, and Starner 2017; Nayak et al. 2019; Yin et al. 2020;
Haroush et al. 2020) when the training data is infeasible
due to large data size or privacy concerns. These approaches
leverage inaccessible information of victim models (e.g., in-
termediate weights, model gradients, and activation statis-
tics). However, model stealing adversaries cannot access
such information. Hence, these data-free knowledge distilla-
tion approaches can not be applied in model stealing attacks.
7 Conclusion
We demonstrated that our attacks successfully stole various
DNNs from the MLaaS providers without any data hurdles.
Even without the knowledge on the victim’s dataset, ES At-
tack (OPT-SYN) outperforms the two baseline attacks by
44.57% on average of four datasets in terms of best accu-
racy. Our experimental results illustrated the better quality
and higher diversity of the generated synthetic data com-
paring with the auxiliary data, which benefits ES Attack. In
addition, most existing defenses are ineffective to prevent
ES Attack, where new countermeasures should be provided.
Moreover, the stolen model can be used to conduct black-
box adversarial attacks against the victim model, and some-
times the black-box attack achieves higher success rates
compared with the white-box attack.
8 Ethics Impact
This paper address a critical challenge in the existing ma-
chine learning services: machine learning models can be
stolen through queries. Most existing model stealing attacks
require the knowledge of the private training data, which un-
dervalued the impact of model stealing attacks. In this work,
we show that even without any training data, the adversary
can successfully steal the machine learning model. On one
side, the adversary can provide the same machine learn-
ing service with a much lower price compared to MLaaS
provider due to the low cost of model stealing attacks. On
the other side, more importantly, model stealing attacks can
facilitate further serious attacks. We hope the severity of
model stealing attacks can attract attention of the community
and encourages the researchers in academia and industry to
investigate effective countermeasures.
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A Architecture of Generator G in DNN-SYN
Figure 4 illustrates the architecture of DNN-based generator
in DNN-SYN. We follow the major architecture of ACGAN.
We feed a random latent vector zi and a generated one-hot la-
bel li into generatorG. We concatenate these two vectors and
up-sample them using several transposed convolution layers.
Transposed convolution layers are parameterized by learnable
weights. Each transposed convolution layer is followed by a
batch normalization layer and a ReLU activation function ex-
cept the last transposed convolution layer. 4 transposed con-
volution layers are used in the model. In the final layer, we use
a Tanh function to output a synthesis image within (−1, 1).
Figure 4: The DNN generator G used in DNN-SYN.
B Synthetic Example Images by OPT-SYN
We synthesize images using OPT-SYN with the best substitute
model. We compare them with the victim’s training data in
the SVHN, CIFAR-10, MNIST and KMNIST datasets (Fig-
ure 5, 6, 7, 8). First row: images in the victim’s training
dataset. Second row: images in the synthetic dataset. Third
Row: corresponding labels of images.
In our data-agnostic attack, the generated synthetic data is
used to train a substitute model. Although the synthetic data,
i.e., a synthetic image, is unrecognizable to humans, it can be
used to train a substitute DNN model with very good stealing
performance as it helps capture the decision boundaries of the
DNNs. Based on this observation, we have the first finding:
the human-unrecognizable synthetic images can be used by
DNN models to classify real images. Similarly, Nguyen et al.
found the fact that the generated images, i.e., imperceptible
to humans, can be classified by a well-trained DNN with high
confidence (Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune 2015). Therefore,
our analysis sheds light on the differences between human
vision and DNNs.
Furthermore, we find that the synthetic dataset in the first
stealing epochD(1)syn shows higher diversity and better quality
than the synthetic dataset generated in the last stealing epoch
D(N)syn based on IS and FID. We believe it is due to either 1)
the first synthetic dataset contributes more to the model train-
ing, or 2) IS and FID are not good metrics to measure the
difference between synthetic data.
C Experimental Settings of Black-box
Adversarial Attacks
Black-box adversarial attacks assume that the adversary can
only access the output of the model by querying the machine
learning service, but the adversary does not know the inter-
nal information of the model (e.g., gradients). Transferability
is commonly used to conduct black-box adversarial attacks,
by training a surrogate model to transfer the adversarial at-
tacks (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016; Liu et al.
2017). In the experiments, we demonstrate how model steal-
ing facilitates black-box adversarial attacks through transfer-
ability.
The evaluation of the black-box adversarial attack is out-
lined as follows: 1) Steal the victim model using ES Attack
and get a substitute model; 2) Perform a white-box `∞-PGD
attack against the substitute model and generate adversarial
examples; 3) Evaluate the generated adversarial examples on
the victim model. We evaluate the transferability of substitute
model to perform a black-box adversarial attack. In the exper-
iment, we use the test dataset Dtest as our evaluation dataset.
We follow the adversarial settings in (Madry et al. 2017) and
consider the untargeted adversarial attacks, where adversar-
ial examples can be classified as any classes other than the
ground-truth class. For the MNIST and KMNIST dataset, we
run 40 iterations of `∞-PGD attack with a step size of 0.01.
We set the maximal perturbation size as 0.3. For the SVHN
and CIFAR10 dataset, we run 20 iterations with a step size of
2/255. The maximal perturbation size is set as 8/255.
D Performance of Countermeasures
D.1 Rounding Prediction
We investigate the impact of rounding decimals on the ES At-
tack. Figure 9 and 10 show the results of experiments with
class probabilities rounded to 0-5 decimals. We compare the
after-rounding classification accuracy of the substitute model
and the victim model. Class probabilities rounded to 2 to 5
decimals have no effect on the adversary’s success. When
rounding further to 1 decimal, the attack is weakened, but
still successful. When we round the precision to 0 decimal
- the victim model only outputs 0 or 1 - the attack is further
weakened, but still can predict in most cases (over 80% accu-
racy). We observe that rounded information brings the uncer-
tainty of the prediction, while this uncertainty sometimes will
slightly improve the training.
D.2 Top-K Prediction
In top-k prediction, the adversary remains the probabili-
ties of the Top-K classes and set the rest classes with
the same probabilities. For example, given an prediction
output of [0.5, 0.02, 0.3, 0.02, 0.15, 0.01], MLaaS provider
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Figure 5: The SVHN Dataset
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Figure 6: The CIFAR-10 Dataset
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Figure 7: The MNIST Dataset
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Figure 8: The KMNIST Dataset
will convert it to [0.5, 0.0, 0.3, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0] using Top-
2 defense and the adversary will then make it up to
[0.5, 0.05, 0.3, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05]. We compare the impact of
probabilities with different numbers (K) of classes on our
model stealing attacks (Figure 11 and 12). The performance
of model stealing attacks is not decreased with fewer classes
providing probabilities (small K).
Figure 9: Evaluation of Rounding Prediction on the
MNIST dataset.
Figure 10: Evaluation of Rounding Prediction on the
KMNIST dataset.
Figure 11: Evaluation of Top-K Prediction on the MNIST
dataset.
Figure 12: Evaluation of Top-K Prediction on the KM-
NIST dataset.
